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COMMENT
NOT-SO-EQUITABLE LIENS: ERISA FIDUCIARIES
CROSS-DRESS LEGAL REMEDIES AS EQUITABLE
Brandon S. Osterbindt
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States has the unfortunate role of finding
the law' and determining what it is.2 While this may seem to be a simple and
intuitive task, interpreting the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) 3 inevitably results in a "descent into a Serbonian bog wherein
judges are forced to don logical blinders and split the linguistic atom to
decide even the most routine cases.
'
The average personal injury plaintiff does not appreciate the nature of the
litigation' that results in the achievement of the plaintiff's ultimate goal:
t Brandon S. Osterbind graduated from Liberty University School of Law in May
2008 and is a judicial clerk to the Honorable William G. Petty of the Court of Appeals of
Virginia. He would like to thank his family for their constant love and encouragement, and
most importantly, he would like to thank his wife Kelly A. Osterbind for making life simply
amazing.
1. Law "is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by
him who has care of the community, and promulgated." 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA, Question 90, art. 4, at 995 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans.,
Benziger Bros. 2d ed. 1948).
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
4. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted). "A Serbonian bog is a mess from which there is no way of
extricating oneself. E. Cobham Brewer, The Dictionary of Phrase and Fable 1121-22 (First
Hypertext ed.). The Serbonian bog itself was between Egypt and Palestine. Strabo called it a
lake, and said it was 200 stadia long, and 50 broad; Pliny made it 150 miles in length. Hume
said that whole armies have been lost therein, as did Milton: 'A gulf profound as that
Serbonian bog, / Betwixt Damiata and Mount Cassius old, / Where armies whole have sunk.'
Milton, Paradise Lost, ii. 592." Id. at 454 n. 1.
5. Robert Friedman, Personal Injury Litigation Guide, 87 AM. JuR. Trials 275 § 14
(2007). Friedman details the complex process of litigation including complaints, answers,
summary judgment practice, motions to dismiss, discovery options, and trial scheduling and
planning. Conspicuously absent from this description of the litigation process is the trial
itself. The average plaintiff typically fails to comprehend the nature of litigation because the
average plaintiff envisions litigation as simply a trial when in fact the majority of litigation
consists more of the pre-trial process.
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judgment and damages.6 Further, the average plaintiff does not appreciate the
nature of post-judgment litigation, which is the subsequent effort by lien
holders to attach a lien to the judgment.7 This litigation is plagued with liens
against a plaintiff's judgment by institutions that have contributed to the
plaintiff's medical care, such as medical care providers, insurance companies,
Medicaid,8 and Employee Benefit Plans ("Plans") governed by ERISA. 9
When a person is injured by a tort, the person may initially seek to have
his or her medical expenses paid by Medicaid (if the person is indigent)' or a
plan (if the person is covered by one)." If the injured person later obtains
recovery from the tortfeasor, Medicaid or the plan asserts a lien against that
recovery, either by operation of law or by contract.
12
6. Michael L. Moffit, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 461, 489 (2007) (pointing out the major problem with
tort litigation and the reason for the decline in civil trial rates, namely procedural changes in
the litigation process that makes litigation cost-prohibitive to the average plaintiff.)
7. It is important to note that this Comment does not use the term "post-judgment
litigation" to refer to a plaintiff's seeking to enforce his or her judgment against an insolvent
defendant. But see Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
603, 617 (2006) (using the term in that manner).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396k (2007) (requiring state agencies to require beneficiaries to
sign right to repayment provisions before extending Medicaid benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 1396p
(2007) (limiting the right of the state agency to seek a lien against a Medicaid beneficiary's
property).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2007) (providing ERISA plan fiduciaries the ability to
seek equitable remedies from a plan beneficiary, including an equitable lien). Whether a
particular employee benefit plan is governed by ERISA is determined by 29 U.S.C. § 1003,
but that issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. This Comment will address only those
employee benefit plans that are governed by ERISA.
Most of the time, medical care providers are compensated by Medicaid, Medicare,
or insurance plans. "In 2004, 34% of personal health care expenditures were paid by the
federal government and 11% by state and local government; private health insurance paid
36% and consumers paid 15% out-of-pocket." NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2006, at 13 (citation and
emphasis omitted).
10. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (list of Medicaid eligibility
requirements).
11. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6)-(8) (definitions of employee, participant, and
beneficiary).
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2007) (providing ERISA plan fiduciaries the ability to
seek equitable remedies from a plan beneficiary, including an equitable lien); J. Michael
Hayes, Are Medicare, Medicaid, and ERISA Liens? Resolving "Liens" in Personal Injury
Settlements, NEW YORK STATE BAR JouRNAL, Sept. 2007, at 30 (stating that "[tihe majority
of the ERISA health insurance plans have, in varying forms, a subrogation/equitable lien
provision.")
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In Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, 3 Marlene and Joel Sereboff
were insured by an employer-sponsored benefit plan administered by Mid
Atlantic Medical Services, Inc. 14 The plan covered their medical expenses for
sickness or injuries. 5 However, the plan provided that if a third party caused
sickness or injury to the Sereboffs and they subsequently obtained recovery
from that third party, the Sereboffs would reimburse the plan out of the
award. 16 The reimbursement provision also mandated that even if the
Sereboffs did not fully recover, the plan's reimbursement would not be
reduced unless the plan agreed to such reduction in writing.1 7 While the
Sereboffs were covered by the plan, they were injured in a car accident.' 8 As
a result of those injuries, the plan paid $74,869.37 in medical expenses on
behalf of the Sereboffs. 19 Later, the Sereboffs settled with a third party
involved in the accident for $750,000, without specifying whether any
portion was allocated to medical expenses.20 The Court granted Mid Atlantic
its lien in the full amount of expenses paid on behalf of the Sereboffs, but did
not inquire into what amount of the settlement was designated for medical
expenses.2 '
The factual situation in Sereboff (involving ERISA liens) is virtually
identical to Arkansas Department of Medical Services v. Ahlborn (involving
Medicaid liens).22 In both cases, a person was injured by a tortfeasor; the
person suffered medical and other damages; the plan or Medicaid paid for
medical treatment of the person; the person sued the tortfeasor; and the plan
or Medicaid asserted a lien against the judgment. While this is a simplified
description of the factual scenario, it is accurate nonetheless.
While both Medicaid and the plan may be entitled to claim a lien arising
out of the same situation, both Medicaid and ERISA diverge in determining
the extent of the lien.23 The ability of both entities to actually have a lien is
not in dispute; however, the extent of the lien should be the subject of much
13. 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
14. Id. at 359.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 360.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Compare supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text with the facts of Arkansas
Department of Health & Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006). Although the
facts are virtually identical, the results are drastically different.
23. Compare Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, with Sereboff, 547 U.S. 356.
2009]
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scrutiny." For example, if the beneficiary of a plan or Medicaid obtains a
judgment for his injuries, is the plan's or Medicaid's lien limited to the
amount the beneficiary recovers for medical damages or the entire judgment
amount?25 If Medicaid only contributed to medical expenses, should its lien
extend to the full judgment amount including non-medical compensatory
damages, or should its lien be limited to only compensatory damages for
medical expenses? 26 Likewise, if a plan only contributes to medical expenses,
should its lien extend to the full judgment including non-medical expenses, or
should its lien be limited to only medical expenses?
27
While the factual scenario is the same, Medicaid and ERISA differ
significantly on this minute point. In Ahlborn, the Supreme Court intimated
that allowing Medicaid to claim a lien for more than the amount for which
the third party is liable for medical expenses is "absurd and fundamentally
unjust."28 In Sereboff the Court did not inquire into the amount for which the
third party is liable for medical expenses, but rather, it allowed the plan to
enforce an equitable lien for the full amount of benefits paid.29
In order to comprehend this drastic deviation from freshly-settled law, this
Comment will explore the leading cases developing the federal common law
24. See Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part IV.A.
27. See infra Part IV.B.
28. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 288 n. 19. The Court did not specifically say that this result was
absurd and fundamentally unjust; rather, the Court compared the outcome in Ahlborn with
the result in Flanigan v. Department of Labor & Industries, 869 P.2d 14 (Wash. 1994). The
Supreme Court noted that in Flanigan, "the court concluded that the state agency could not
satisfy its lien out of damages the injured worker's spouse recovered as compensation for
loss of consortium. The court explained that the department could not 'share in damages for
which it has provided no compensation' because such a result would be 'absurd and
fundamentally unjust."' Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 288 n.19 (quoting Flanigan, 869 P.2d 14, 17).
The Supreme Court used Flanagan to illustrate why it would not allow Medicaid to claim a
lien for the amount in excess of the amount for which the third party is liable for medical
expenses. This Comment will strive to define what the Supreme Court means when it says
that something is fundamentally unjust. Even though it seems that the Court's definition is
strikingly similar to the legal positivist definition, this Comment will argue that justice is an
extrinsic standard by which we must judge our laws.
29. See Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., 547 U.S. 356 (2006). Actually, it is
unclear whether justice was done in this case because the award was not apportioned
between the different types of compensatory damages. The plaintiff recovered $750,000, and
the lien was for approximately $75,000. It does not seem unreasonable that 10% of the entire
award was attributable to medical expenses. But without specifying the limitation on the
equitable lien, the Supreme Court made imprecise law that, in turn, allows injustice to reign
in the district courts. Regardless, the plan claimed a lien for the full amount that it paid for
the beneficiary's medical expenses, and the Court agreed and gave the full compensation.
[Vol. 3:103
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of ERISA through which the federal judiciary established a right to an
equitable lien inuring to the benefit of the plan, and the common law that
should inform the courts' determination of the plan's remedy against the
beneficiary.3 ° While tracing the development of this federal common law, this
Comment will analyze the application of common law rules to the statutory
limitation of remedies available to an Employee Benefit Plan, that is,
equitable relief.31 The largest limitation to a plan's recovery is this equitable
relief requirement. In light of this limitation, this Comment will attempt to
differentiate legal relief from equitable relief in order to determine whether
the Supreme Court correctly concluded that the remedy in Sereboff was
equitable.32 Contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion, this Comment will
conclude that the relief granted in Sereboff is legal, rather than equitable; and
therefore, the statute prohibits such relief.
33
Furthermore, this Comment will analogize ERISA lien situations to
Medicaid lien situations and argue that the courts have misapplied the
principles of equity and ignored the principles established in Ahlborn.34
Specifically, the Supreme Court has ignored the principle ofjustice in ERISA
reimbursement cases and attempted to define justice, an extra-systemic
principle, systemically. 35 In sum, this Comment will conclude that if the
results in Medicaid reimbursement cases were unjust, then the results in
ERISA reimbursement cases are likewise unjust. Therefore, the statutory
requirement that relief be equitable requires the court to limit the plan's lien
against a plaintiff's judgment to the amount for which the third party is liable
for medical expenses.36
II. FEDERAL COMMON LAW REGARDING REIMBURSEMENT
OF ERISA FIDUCIARIES
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 in response to a substantial number of
employers instituting employee benefit plans.37 The purpose of ERISA was to
increase the equitable character of the plans, and to ensure that when plans
were mismanaged, employees would be protected from significant loss. 8
30. See infra Part II.
31. See infra Part II.B.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See id.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. See infra Part V.B.
36. See infra Part V.
37. Pub. L. No. 93-406 § 2(A) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2009)).
38. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2009) (stating the purpose and congressional findings that
prompted Congress to enact the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, such as
2009]
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Thirty-five years later, an evaluation of the current status of the law reveals
an obvious preference for reimbursing plans for the full extent of benefits
paid in the case of third party liability.39 This preference fails to ensure the
equitable character of the plan and disregards the protection of the
beneficiaries. Because Congress failed to regulate and guide the courts in the
resolution of third party liability issues, the federal courts have applied what
they call a "federal common law. ' 4°
This federal common law has emerged, for the purposes of this Comment,
largely around the interpretation of four words: "other appropriate equitable
relief.' 41 ERISA provides the fiduciaries of an Employee Benefit Plan the
ability to sue the beneficiary for equitable relief.42 Federal courts have
struggled to interpret that language, mainly because of the ambiguity of what
the term "equitable" includes.43 However, in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,
the stability of employment, successful development of industrial relations, lack of employee
information and adequate safeguards concerning their operation, inadequacy of current
minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to
pay promised benefits where endangered employees are being deprived of anticipated
benefits because of the termination of plans without adequate funds, protection of the
revenue of the United States, and free flow of commerce; and stating the authority under
which Congress has the power to regulate employee benefit plans, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3). The intent behind enacting ERISA was to ensure that there would be minimum standards
to assure the equitable character of each plan.
.39. See Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Servs., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); In re Carpenter,
245 B.R. 39 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000); Dugan v. Nickla, 763 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. I11. 1991);
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller,
906 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1990). This Comment argues that this result is a legal remedy, and it
is fundamentally unjust in light of the considerations emphasized in Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at
288.
40. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989), In Re
Carpenter, 245 B.R. 39, 45 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000); Pacificare Inc. v. Martin, 34 F.3d 834,
836 (9th Cir. 1994). This concept of a federal common law is not the same as the concept
dealt with in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); rather, it is a
development of federal statutory interpretation incorporating common law concepts, such as
an equitable lien.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Sereboff, 547 U.S. 356 (holding that the claim was equitable because the
funds were in the possession of the beneficiary); Great West Life & Annuity Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (holding that the claim was legal because the property was
not in the possession of the beneficiary); Carpenter, 245 B.R. 39 (holding that the claim was
equitable because the contract identified particular property with a particular obligation);
FMC Medical Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the claim was not
equitable because the basis of the claim sounded in contract rather than subrogation or
restitution); Wailer, 906 F.2d 985, 993 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the factual situation was
the "archetypal unjust enrichment scenario" and allowing the restitution remedy); Dugan,
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which was the Supreme Court's first attempt to interpret this language, the
Court stated that "[t]he authority of courts to develop a 'federal common law'
under ERISA . . . is not the authority to revise the text of the statute.
'
"
4
Therefore, even though the federal courts can fashion a federal common law,
a court cannot award legal relief because the statute expressly limits a plan's
relief to equitable relief.
45
The Supreme Court interpreted the text of the statute to allow "appropriate
equitable relief for the purpose of redress[ing any] violations or . . .
enforc[ing] any provisions of ERISA or an ERISA plan.'"' In Mertens, the
plaintiffs sought relief from a non-fiduciary who participated in a breach of
fiduciary duty, which led to losses by the plan as a whole.47 The Court
refused to grant the plaintiff's requested relief because their relief was legal
in nature, rather than equitable.48
Although they often dance around the word, what petitioners in
fact seek is nothing other than compensatory damages-monetary
relief for all losses their plan sustained as a result of the alleged
breach of fiduciary duties. Money damages are, of course, the
classic form of legal relief.
49
The Court defined compensatory damages, for ERISA purposes, as (1)
monetary relief, and (2) a result of a breach of a legal duty. The Court
analogized the language in Title 29 of the United States Code, section
1 132(a)(3) to the language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, where
the Court interpreted the phrase "'any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate' . . . to preclude awards for compensatory or punitive
damages."50 The attitude of the Mertens Court was to eliminate the possibility
763 F. Supp. at 984 (holding that the language of the plan authorizes a lien against the
judgment property because the contractual language provides for "any recovery.., from
any person").
44. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 259 (1993). Mertens seems to
expressly limit the application of the creative (legislative) minds of federal judges. Mertens
is the original case dealing with 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3). While Mertens dealt with a
different issue from the topic of this Comment, Mertens opened the door for further
interpretation of § 11 32(a)(3) in Knudson.
45. See infra Part III for a discussion of 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
46. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 253 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id. at251.
48. Id. at 255.
49. Id. (emphasis added on "monetary relief' and "as a result of'); see also Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974); Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570-71 (1990); DAN
B. DOBBs, 1 LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 3 (2d ed. 1993).
50. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
2009]
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of subterfuge; that is, claiming equitable remedies when, at the core, the
petitioner seeks legal remedies. To prevent that subterfuge, the Court required
that if both elements of compensatory damages are met, then the relief is, at
its base, legal. "[T]he text of ERISA leaves no doubt that Congress intended
'equitable relief to include only those types of relief that were typically
available in equity, such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution." 51 Since
the relief sought was legal, it was proscribed by ERISA.
Thus, the question that courts must answer before allowing a fiduciary to
seek relief from the beneficiary is whether the relief sought is legal or
equitable. This section will explore the key cases dealing with the type of
relief sought and the underlying remedy allowed by the courts under the
"other appropriate equitable relief' language.
A. Where an ERISA Beneficiary Recovers from a Third-Party Tortfeasor, the
ERISA Fiduciary May Assert an Equitable Lien for the Full Amount of
Benefits Paid.
Federal courts have ruled for and against the concept of equitable liens,
developing the current body of federal common law.52 While the courts
struggled for some time to determine the exact device that allows the plan to
recover in such a way, the Supreme Court finally settled the issue in favor of
allowing equitable liens. 3
Before the courts created a cause of action for equitable liens, the courts
relied upon other equitable recovery methods.54 The court in Dugan v. Nickla
squarely addressed the issue of this Comment in a subrogation context.55 In
that case, the issue was "whether the subrogation provision covers amounts
received from third parties for pain and suffering, disability and
disfigurement, and lost earnings. 56 The plan claimed a lien against the
beneficiary's judgment for the amount of "$60,690.10 for medical payments
and $8,632.51 for disability payments" because the plan had paid for both of
51. Id. at 248.
52., See, e.g., Great-West Life Ins. & Annuity Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002);
Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); In re Carpenter, 245
B.R. 39 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000); Pacificare Inc. v. Martin, 34 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 1994);
Dugan v. Nickla, 763 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
53. See Sereboff, 547 U.S. 356.
54. Dugan v. Nickla, 763 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (allowing a claim for
subrogation pursuant to the terms of the plan).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 983.
[Vol. 3:103
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these injuries.57 The beneficiary, in that case, recovered from a third party
tortfeasor as follows:
58
Medical Expenses: $7,000
Pain and Suffering: $56,000
Disability and Disfigurement: $55,000
Lost Wages: $22,750
Total: $140,750
The court discussed the provisions of the plan and held that the plan did not
limit the lien to the amount of medical expenses recovered by the beneficiary;
the court granted a broad lien against the beneficiary's entire judgment.59 The
court allowed the plan to recover $60,000 when the beneficiary only
recovered $7,000 for medical expenses from the tortfeasor and the plan only
paid $8,632.51 for disability. 60 The plan, in essence, took $44,367.49 from
the beneficiary's recovery for pain and suffering, disability, and lost wages.6 ,
While this conclusion was governed by ERISA, the Supreme Court
viewed this conclusion as absurd and fundamentally unjust in Medicaid lien
situations.62 In fact, this conclusion blatantly contradicts the analysis in
Ahlborn, which held that Medicaid liens are limited to the amount recovered
from the tortfeasor for medical expenses.63 Following the Ahlborn analysis,
because the plan only contributed to the beneficiaries' medical expenses and
disability, the plan is only entitled to the recovery for medical expenses and
disability; that is, $7,000 and $8,632.51 for a total of $15,632.51. 64 It appears
that the court in Dugan allowed the plan to share in damages for which it
provided no compensation. The plan only compensated for medical expenses
and disability, but it never provided compensation for pain and suffering or
lost wages. 65 Thus, the plan paid for medical expenses that it was
contractually required to pay. In consideration for that contractual obligation,
the beneficiary, or the beneficiary's employer, is obligated to pay premiums,
probably on a monthly basis. Even though the plan paid $60,690.10, allowing
57. Id. at 982.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 984.
60. Id.
61. This Comment will argue in Parts Ill-IV that this result is unjust.
62. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 288 n.19 (2006).
63. Id. passim.
64. Dugan, 763 F. Supp. at 984. Even though the beneficiary recovered $55,000 for
disability and disfigurement, the plan only contributed $8,632.51. Id.
65. Id. at 982.
20091
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the plan to recover beyond that to which it is entitled makes the relief legal,
not equitable.66
On the contrary, in Pacificare Inc. v. Martin, the beneficiary's plan
included the equivalent of a "rights of third parties" provision, which required
that if the beneficiary recovered damages for injuries caused by a third party,
then the plan would be entitled to reimbursement. 67 The beneficiary
recovered a full award from the third party tortfeasor.68 The district court for
the Central District of California dismissed the case for failure to state an
equitable claim and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the decision.
69
The Ninth Circuit stated that the plan's claim was not equitable because it
was based on a breach of contract theory, which is a legal claim.70 The Ninth
Circuit applied the traditional analysis distinguishing legal from equitable
remedies; that is, a claim for breach of contract is the quintessential legal
claim. By suing under the "rights of third parties" provision, the plan is
essentially saying that the beneficiary has failed to reimburse the plan under
the terms of the contract; therefore, the plan is entitled to damages for breach
of contract. The Ninth Circuit, unlike the district court in Dugan, recognized
that this breach of contract issue means that the remedy sought is legal and
not equitable.71 The plan's right to reimbursement arises directly out of a
contractual agreement by both parties. The core claim does not change when
the plan phrases the relief in equitable terms. Otherwise, the court elevates
form over substance, which lends to stratagem, which in turn lends to
injustice, corruption, and subterfuge.
Compare FMC Medical Plan v. Owens,72 where the plan paid
approximately $50,000 for medical expenses and Owens settled his claim for
$100,000 (the maximum limit of the tortfeasor's policy).73 The Ninth Circuit
held that the remedy sought was legal, not equitable.74 The court said that
restitution in the form of a constructive trust is limited to "ill-gotten" gains
and does not apply to any other form of unjust enrichment.75 Rather than
66. See infra Parts III-IV.
67. Pacificare, Inc. v. Martin, 34 F.3d 834, 835 (9th Cir. 1994).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 838.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. FMC Medical Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 1997).
73. Id. at 1259.
74. Id. at 1262.
75. Id. at 1261 ("ill-gotten" gains refers to gains received based on fraud or some other
illegal method).
[Vol. 3:103
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equating the plan's claim to subrogation or a constructive trust, the court
chose to view this claim as one for breach of contract seeking monetary
damages.76 However, the court implied that if the plan provided for
subrogation, such a remedy would be allowed under 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(3). 7 Owens' plan did not provide for subrogation; rather, it simply
required the beneficiary to reimburse FMC for its payments made on his
behalf, should Owens recover from a third party.
78
This "right to reimbursement" provision is essentially the same provision
as the "acts of third parties" provision that was present in Sereboff.79 In
holding that the relief sought was legal, the Ninth Circuit cited a 1995
decision in which the court held that "equitable relief in the form of the
recovery of compensatory damages is not an available remedy under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). '' 80 The court further indicated that "[w]hen the substance
of the relief is monetary, . . . such a remedy is not available under section
1132(a)(3)."'" This language tracks the Mertens test almost precisely: when
the underlying claim is legal, and-the relief sought is monetary/compensatory,
the claim as a whole is legal and therefore proscribed by ERISA.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis narrowly construed 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)--
a view that is dictated by a strict interpretation of the statutory language.
Congress specifically provided a remedy for "other appropriate equitable
relief.''82 In order to interpret the statutory language, the federal courts must
give due deference to every word of the statute and presume that Congress
meant every word that it used to effectuate its goals.83 By including the term
76. Id. at 1261. The Ninth Circuit stated that the relief sought was not subrogation
because there was no subrogation provision in the plan that entitled the plan to "step in the
shoes" of Owens. Furthermore, the claim was not for restitution because the gains received
by the beneficiary were paid rightfully under the terms of the plan. Because the funds paid
by the plan were not obtained unlawfully, there can be no restitution of ill-gotten gains.
77. Id. at 1260.
78. Id. at 1260. Specifically, the plan called this a "Right to Reimbursement" provision.
79. Sereboff, 547 U.S. 356 (2006). The "Acts of Third Parties" provisions are virtually
identical to the "Right to Reimbursement" provisions because both are contingent on acts of
third parties and both require repayment in the case of a recovery from that third party. The
majority of ERISA plans provide for this situation where the beneficiary is injured by a third
party tortfeasor and the plan has paid some funds for the medical expenses resulting from
that injury. See Hayes, supra note 12, at 30.
80. FMC, 122 F.3d at 1261 (quoting McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint, Inc., 46 F.3d 956,
960 (9th Cir. 1995).
81. Id. at 1262.
82. 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3) (2009).
83. Mertens, 508 U.S. 248 (1993). The Court discussed its refusal to infer causes of
action and stated that ERISA's "carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides
'strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply
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"equitable" in front of the word "relief," the federal courts must presume that
Congress intended to limit the relief available to employee benefit plans
governed by ERISA. Even though modern courts have merged the law and
equity courts, the limitation precludes federal judges from granting legal
relief to a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan. The questions then become:
what is legal relief, and what is equitable relief?. Federal courts have
distinguished the two on several occasions and the Ninth Circuit upheld that
distinction in FMC.84
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Great West Life & Annuity Ins.
Co. v. Knudson apparently to distinguish between what relief is permitted
under the statute and what relief is not.85 In Knudson, the plan sought
restitution for benefits paid to the beneficiary because of damages that the
beneficiary recovered from a third party tortfeasor under a contract term
similar to the "rights of third parties" provision in Pacificare.86 However, in
Knudson, the funds from the recovery were disbursed via two checks: one to
the attomey for fees and expenses, and another to a "special needs trust" with
the plan beneficiary as the beneficiary of the trust.8 7 The plan argued that
restitution is a form of equitable relief, but the Supreme Court disagreed and
asserted that restitution can be both a legal and an equitable remedy. 88 In
disagreeing with the plan, the Court articulated a rather mechanical standard:
"[R]estitution is a legal remedy when ordered in a case at law and
an equitable remedy . .. when ordered in an equity case," and
whether it is legal or equitable depends on the "basis for [the
forgot to incorporate expressly.'."); See also Platt v. Union Pac. R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 58
(1878) (stating that the "admitted rules of statutory construction declare that a legislature is
presumed to have used no superfluous words. Courts are to accord a meaning, if possible, to
every world [sic] in a statute.").
84. FMC Medical Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258, 1259 (9th Cir. 1997); cf Wenzel &
Henoch Const. Co. v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern Cal., 18 F. Supp. 616, 620 (S.D.
Cal. 1937) (noting that "[t]he distinction between law and equity is maintained rigorously in
the federal courts.... Behind [this principle] is the fundamental fact that law and equity are
dissimilar. The dissimilarity lies in the substantive rights which they administer. Even the
reformed code procedure, which has abolished the distinction between actions at law and
suits in equity and allows remedies both legal and equitable to be administered in the same
forum and in the same action, has not abolished the substantive distinction between law and
equity. To call for the intervention of a court of chancery, it is still necessary, under it, to
allege special equitable grounds").
85. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
86. Id. at 207.
87. Id. at 207-08, 214.
88. Id. at212.
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plaintiffs] claim" and the nature of the underlying remedies
sought
[F]or restitution to lie in equity, the action generally must
seek not to impose personal liability on the defendant, but to
restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property in the
defendant's possession.89
The analysis in Knudson was rather simple under this test: because the money
was not in the respondent's possession, the Court held that the petitioners
sought to impose personal liability on the respondent for money that was past
due under a contract, which was traditionally a legal remedy.90
The Knudson test, though, can be very complicated and may require more
than the light intellectual treatment the Supreme Court gave it in Sereboff.
The test for legal versus equitable remedies set out by Knudson includes (1) a
negative element and (2) a positive element. The negative element is that the
action must not seek to impose personal liability on the defendant. The
positive element is that the funds have to be in the defendant's possession.
Conceptually, the positive element is a part of the negative element. In other
words, if the funds are not in the defendant's possession, then the application
of a lien imposes personal liability on the defendant.9 The converse,
however, is not necessarily true because the Supreme Court has enunciated
an additional requirement that the plaintiff be, in good conscience, entitled to
the funds.92 The converse would be that if the funds are in the defendant's
89. Id. at 213-14 (emphasis added) (quoting Reich v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.3d
754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)). In Knudson, the Supreme Court held that the statutory reference to
"equitable relief' should be construed narrowly, in particular to the relief typically available
in courts of equity. Thus, the Court distinguished between two types of restitution:
restitution that would have been available in a court of law, and restitution that would have
been available in a court of equity. Only the latter can be awarded under § 1 132(a)(3).
90. Id. at214.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 213, 214. Equitable restitution in the form of constructive trust or equitable
liens is permitted when "money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the
plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant's
possession." Id. at 213. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he basis for [the plan's] claim is
not that [the beneficiaries] hold particular funds that, in good conscience, belong to [the
plan], but that [the plan is] contractually entitled to some funds for benefits that they
conferred. The kind of restitution that petitioners seek, therefore, is not equitable-the
imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien on particular property-but legal-the
imposition of personal liability for the benefits that they conferred upon [the beneficiaries]."
The Knudson opinion focused on "in the defendant's possession" and glossed over
"belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff." Because of this gloss in Knudson, the
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possession, then the application of a lien does not impose personal liability on
the defendant. However, the converse would still allow a plan to impose
personal liability on a beneficiary because it could seek funds to which the
plan is not, in good conscience, entitled. In interpreting Knudson, Judge
Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he Supreme
Court's most recent § 1132(a)(3) decisions demonstrate how the absence of
unjust possession is fatal to an equitable restitution claim., 93 Thus, it is not
enough that the defendant possess the funds, but that possession must be
unjust.
The Supreme Court in Knudson did not rely on the negative element of
equitable restitution. Rather, it only relied on the positive element that the
funds had to be in the defendant's possession.94 However, the fact that the
money is in the defendant's possession is only a factor to determine whether
the action imposes personal liability on the defendant. That is why it is clear
that if the money is not in the defendant's possession, then the action will
always seek to impose personal liability on the defendant.
The Supreme Court's analysis stopped here, but its analysis is incomplete
because it ignores the requirement that the plan must be, in good conscience,
entitled to the particular funds that it identified.95 The Court must look to
other factors to determine whether the action seeks to impose personal
liability on the defendant. Other factors may include the basis of the claim;
what property is physically sought, and if money is sought, how the amount
is gauged; and whether either party has been unjustly enriched.96 While
Knudson is what most would consider a landmark case in the federal
common law of ERISA, its application by subsequent courts has been
incomplete because they fail to analyze the negative element of the Supreme
Court's test.97
Sereboff opinion similarly glossed over the "belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff'
element.
93. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 450 F.3d 570, 575 (4th Cir. 2006), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008). The Supreme Court held that 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) does not limit recovery against a fiduciary to participants of the entire
plan. Rather, an individual participant in a plan has an action for lost profits of a defined
contribution plan where there has been a breach of trust.
94. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 213,214.
95. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
96. These are just a few suggestions of factors at which the Supreme Court should look
when asking this essential question: whether the relief sought is equitable.
97. As a principal example, the analysis in Sereboff never asked whether the plan was,
in good conscience, entitled to the funds in the plan.
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After several years of confusion among the circuits in their attempts to
interpret Knudson,98 the Supreme Court in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical
Services, Inc., allowed an equitable lien in favor of the plan for $74,869.37. 99
The situation was virtually identical to that in Knudson except the funds were
disbursed to the Sereboffs instead of to a special needs trust.'00 Mr. and Mrs.
Sereboff recovered $750,000 in a settlement from the third party tortfeasor.' O'
Instead of focusing on the federal common law of ERISA, and conceptually
interpreting and refining the new test propounded in Knudson, the Supreme
Court relied heavily on Barnes v. Alexander,10 2 a case completely removed
from ERISA but focused on equitable liens by agreement. 1
03
The Court haphazardly relied on Knudson to allow an equitable lien
because the property was in the defendant's possession, but, like Knudson,
the Court did not adequately discuss the negative element of the Knudson
test) °4 Instead of following the rule propounded in Knudson, the Supreme
Court followed the facts: because the money is in the Sereboffs' possession,
the relief is equitable.10 5 Because the Supreme Court failed to analyze the
negative element of the Knudson test, the Court's application in Sereboff is
myopic at best. Even when the money is in the beneficiary's possession, the
relief sought is still legal if it imposes personal liability on the defendant, and
thus granting the relief violates the statutory limitation.
B. An ERISA Fiduciary May Seek Only Equitable Remedies.
The Supreme Court has stated that ERISA's enforcement scheme is
comprehensive, and the courts should hesitate to modify it. 10 6 While the
98. See Gates v. Hartford Life Group Ins. Co., 2006 WL 2981191 (S.D. Tex. 2006)
(stating that "the authorities to which Plaintiff cites justifiably bemoan the tangled state of
ERISA jurisprudence").
99. Sereboffv. Mid Atlantic Medical Servs., 547 U.S. 356, 360 (2006).
100. Id.; compare Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 363-64 (relying on Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117 (1914)).
103. See infra Part III.B.l for discussion on the distinctions between Barnes and
Sereboff.
104. This Comment will fully address the implications of Sereboff on Knudson, Mertens,
and general principles of equity in Part III.
105. Sereboff, 547 U.S. 356, 362 (holding that "[the] impediment to characterizing the
relief in Knudson as equitable is not present here").
106. "'ERISA is a "comprehensive and reticulated statute," the product of a decade of
congressional study of the Nation's private employee benefit system."' Knudson, 534 U.S. at
209 (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993) (citation omitted)). "We
have therefore been especially 'reluctant to tamper with [the] enforcement scheme'
embodied in the statute by extending remedies not specifically authorized by its text."
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statute is comprehensive in some respects, its enforcement is exceedingly
vague. The federal courts have long struggled to interpret the meaning of
"other appropriate equitable relief."'0 7 ERISA provides, in pertinent part, that
a fiduciary may bring a "civil action... to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief ... ,,08 In the Supreme Court's first attempt to define appropriate
equitable relief, the Court said that "[e]quitable relief must mean something
less than all relief."' 9 Courts must give proper effect to the words chosen by
Congress to effectuate its intent, and here, the words chosen by Congress are
words of limitation."0 Accordingly, legal relief is impermissible under the
statute. Furthermore, the Supreme Court explained in Knudson, "the term
'equitable relief . . . must refer to those categories of relief that were
typically available in equity.""'
The question left remaining, then, is what relief was typically available in
equity and what relief was typically available at law? The Knudson court
characterized the two different types of relief as restitution, but restitution can
be legal or equitable.! 12 Legal restitution sought to "impose personal liability"
on the beneficiary for a contractual obligation to pay money while equitable
restitution sought to obtain money or property clearly traceable and identified
as belonging in good conscience to the plan." 3 The latter is the only kind of
restitution available for Employee Benefit Plans under ERISA, and the
Supreme Court should recognize the importance of limiting a fiduciary's
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209 (quoting Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134, 147 (1985)).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3); see Mertens, 508 U.S. 248 (1993), FMC Med. Plan v.
Owens, 122 F.3d 1258, 1259 (9th Cir. 1997), Pacificare Inc. v. Martin, 34 F.3d 834, 835 (9th
Cir. 1994), Dugan v. Nickla, 763 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 states: "A civil action may be brought ... (3) by a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the
plan .... 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (emphasis added).
109. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258 n.8 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
110. Professor Colleen E. Medill has opined that the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the word "equitable" as a word of limitation was in error. She would have the Court read
"appropriate equitable relief' as including in that word the "fusion" of law and equity in the
American court system today. Colleen E. Medill, Resolving the Judicial Paradox of
"Equitable" Relief under ERISA Section 502(A)(3), 39 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 827, 853
(2006) (quoting John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable, 103 COLUM. L. Rev.
1317, 1365 (2003)).
111. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
112. Id. at 212-14.
113. Id.
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remedy to equitable remedies and should refuse to allow legal remedies like
those in Sereboff.
Ill. THE REMEDY IN SEREBOFF WAS LEGAL, NOT EQUITABLE
Equitable relief, according to the Supreme Court, includes "those
categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction,
mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages)." ' 14 Mertens did
not conclusively determine which actions are and are not allowed, but it did
provide a basis for interpreting the phrase "other appropriate equitable
relief. ""5 If a fiduciary seeks any relief other than equitable relief, then the
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 16 Instead of actually seeking equitable
relief, the petitioner in Mertens sought compensatory damages, or money
damages, which is "the classic form of legal relief."'"17 Therefore, as in
Mertens, the Court should have found that the plan in Sereboff sought nothing
other than compensatory damages-relief for all losses the plan sustained
because of the injury-which is legal relief. Because the plan did in fact seek
legal relief, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction." 8
The distinction between legal and equitable remedies is necessary in
determining whether the plan can recover and whether a federal court has
subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, a full discussion requires dialogue of the
distinctions between both remedies to determine whether the "federal
common law" has adequately honored that distinction and, in an attempt to
allow the plan to recover, allowed legal remedies to cross-dress as equitable
remedies.
114. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
115. Id. at 255-59.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 requires subject matter jurisdiction to arise under a federal
question. Because the federal law allowing a claim to be brought inherently limits those
claims to equitable claims, the Court lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction over the legal
claims. Diversity of citizenship, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, does not provide subject matter
jurisdiction because the action arises under federal law and not state law. In diversity cases,
the Courts apply state law to settle the claims when there is complete diversity. In this case,
there would be no state law to apply because the claim arises under federal law.
117. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255 (emphasis omitted); see also LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg &
Assocs., 450 F.3d 570, 575 (4th Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds, 128 S. Ct.
1020 (2008).
118. Seesupranote 116.
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A. Traditional Equitable Remedies
A common maxim of equity provides that "[e]quity will not suffer a
wrong without a remedy."'" 9 The courts created equitable remedies because
the rigidness of the legal system sometimes left a party without a remedy in a
specific case: "Wherever a situation exists which is contrary to the principles
of equity and which can be redressed within the scope of judicial action, a
court of equity will devise a remedy to meet the situation, though no similar
relief has been given before.' 20 In order to rectify the situation and provide
for citizens who had suffered a wrong' 21 against them, the King gave the
chancellor the responsibility of deciding cases of equity. 22 Traditionally,
equitable relief is available only where legal relief is not adequate.'
2 3
When considering remedies in general, Dan Dobbs posits that "[t]he two
major remedial questions are (1) what remedy or combination of remedies
can or should be awarded? and (2) what is the measure, or the scope, of the
119. HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 76 (2d ed. 1948);
see also Howard W. Brill, The Maxims of Equity, 1993 ARK. L. NOTES 29, 29 (1993) ("This
creativity has allowed equity courts to grant relief not otherwise supported by precedent.
Accordingly, an equity court may reform contracts, enforce future crop liens, order the sale
of land for reinvestment purposes, compel an accounting and impound the proceeds for
damages to property that will pass to a remainderman, establish constructive trusts, mandate
signatures on documents, order the enactment of taxes, and decree structural changes in
governmental institutions." (footnotes omitted)).
120. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 119, at 76. The concept of equity courts was that they
could devise new equitable remedies to meet new situations with which they were faced.
McClintock goes on to say that the "absence of precedent for the particular relief sought is
no bar to action." Id. at 77. In this case, no court has recognized the need to use special
verdict forms to apportion judgments between the types of compensatory damages and limit
the plan's lien to medical expenses under ERISA. However, under Medicaid, the same
situation was presented, and the Supreme Court said in Ahlborn that any other result would
be absurd and fundamentally unjust. See infra Part IV.A.
121. See Whitaker and Co. v. Sewer Imp. Dist. No. 1 of Dardanelle, Ark., 221 F.2d 649,
652 (8th Cir. 1955) ("The required basis for application of this maxim is the presence of a
'wrong'. 'Wrong', as used here, does not mean a moral duty only, unconnected with legal
obligations. A court of equity cannot, by avowing that there is a right but no remedy known
to law, create a remedy in violation of law, or even without the authority of law. What then,
are the 'legal obligations' due appellant, the violation of which constitutes a 'wrong' giving
him a right to avail himself of this maxim?" (quotation marks and citations omitted)).
122. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 119, at 3. "The power of the chancellor as an equity judge
and his jurisdiction to give relief in those cases where the ordinary forms of the common law
were not adequate to meet the case were both derived from the prerogative of the king to
administer justice between his subjects unfettered by the restrictions of ordinary procedure."
Id.
123. See, e.g., Goldschmidt Thermit Co v. Primos Chemical Co., 225 F. 769 (E.D. Pa.
1915); Gaines v. Miller, 111 U.S. 395 (1884).
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remedy chosen?"'124 When a plan seeks relief, the first question is easily
answered by saying that the only remedies that can be awarded are equitable
remedies. The second question, however, is more difficult. Each traditional
equitable remedy available must answer the second question: "[W]hat is the
measure, or the scope, of the remedy?' 25 The court must answer this
question before conclusively determining whether the relief sought is
equitable.
The difficulty here relates to the restitution and the nature of the remedy
because even though a plaintiff can seek restitution, restitution can be a legal
remedy. 126 Accordingly, there are four traditional restitutionary remedies in
equity: constructive trust, equitable lien, subrogation, and accounting for
profits. 127 The court may "choose among the equitable remedies to best
reflect the equities of the particular case and to best effectuate remedial
policies as they apply to the particular facts."'
128
While the court has the choice of which equitable remedy to impose, one
must note that all of these remedies are restitutionary. The remedies are
invoked for the same reason: to prevent unjust enrichment. 129 Furthermore,
modem courts have upheld the concept that for a remedy to be equitable, it
must not seek to impose personal liability on the defendant, but to restore to
the plaintiff particular funds or property in the defendant's possession, which
124. DOBBS, supra note 49, at 1.
125. Id.
126. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002)
(classifying restitution as legal or equitable).
127. DOBBS, supra note 49, at 587.
128. Id. at 588.
129. Id. at 597, 601. See, e.g., Department of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 262-
63 (1999) ( "An equitable lien does not give the plaintiff the very thing to which he was
entitled; instead, it merely grants a plaintiff a security interest in the property, which [the
plaintiff] can then use to satisfy a money claim, usually a claim for unjust enrichment."
(citations and quotation marks omitted)); Goodwin v. C.N.J., Inc., 436 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir.
2006) ("The remedy of restitution is available only when equitable considerations demand
that a party disgorge an undeserved benefit or gain."); Leisure Resort Tech., Inc. v. Trading
Cove Assocs., 889 A.2d 785, 797 (2006) ("A plaintiff may seek restitution if the defendant
has committed a civil wrong, usually a tort or breach of contract, and the plaintiff prefers to
recover the amount the defendant was enriched by her wrongful conduct as opposed to
damages."); Flaherty v. Borough of Naugatuck, No. CV054004400S, 2007 WL 586788, at
*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2007) ("Unjust enrichment applies wherever justice requires
compensation to be given for property or services rendered under a contract, and no remedy
is available by an action on the contract."); see also Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity:
An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REv. 2083, 2098 (2001)
("[R]estitution might be defined ... by reference to a prevalent (if not exclusive) feature of
restitution claims: gain obtained by the defendant, usually at the plaintiffs expense.").
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in good conscience belongs to the plaintiff.130 Modem courts seem to ignore
the other criteria set forth in the common law.13' The common law provided
relief in equity to those who have been wronged and against those who have
been unjustly enriched. The courts gloss over the qualification of unjust
enrichment and the measure of relief. The bottom line is that when the
plaintiff gauges his recovery based on his loss, rather than the defendant's
gain, then the relief sought is, at core, legal, not equitable. 1
32
In order to determine the type of remedy imposed in the Sereboffcase, this
Comment will consider constructive trusts, equitable liens, replevin, detinue,
and assumpsit, because the federal common law, as it relates to ERISA, is
preoccupied with those restitutionary remedies, rather than ejectment,
subrogation, and accounting for profits.
1. Constructive Trust
The constructive trust is a remedy for unjust enrichment. 133 A constructive
trust arises "[w]here a person holding title to property is subject to an
equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly
enriched if he were permitted to retain it . . . ,,.34 Contrasted with an
equitable lien, a constructive trust gives the plaintiff title to the specific
property by which the defendant has been unjustly enriched, while the
equitable lien gives only a security interest in the property. 135 At common
law, the constructive trust was modeled after the quasi-contract legal claim. 1
36
According to Dobbs, the difference between the quasi-contract and the
constructive trust is that the quasi-contract seeks to obtain money and "does
130. See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 213-14.
131. See, e.g., Sereboffv. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., 547 U.S. 356, 365 (2006).
132. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 450 F.3d 570, 575 (4th Cir. 2006),
vacated on other grounds, 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008). See also Sherwin, supra note 129, at 2098
n.66 for a general recognition of debate regarding whether restitution should be based on
benefit or harm. It would seem, particularly in ERISA cases, that restitution must be based
on the unjust benefit received by the beneficiary. If legal restitution were permitted, then one
could argue that legal restitution could possibly be based on the harm done to the plan, but
legal restitution is proscribed by statute. Equitable restitution, however, is more likely to rely
on the concept of unjust enrichment (as the Fourth Circuit did in Larue) because equitable
restitution is based on the concepts of flexibility and justice. Certainly, in Medicaid cases,
the lien resembles equitable restitution for an unjust enrichment of the beneficiary. The lien
is also limited to medical expenses recovered by the beneficiary in a settlement or judgment.
See infra Part IV.A.
133. DOBBS, supra note 49, at 597.
134. RESTATEMENT (FiRsT) OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937).
135. DOBBS, supra note 49, at 588, 589, 603.
136. Id. at 590.
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not require the plaintiff to identify any particular asset as rightly 'belonging'
to him."'
137
In ERISA lien cases, the plan always seeks to obtain money because the
lien is levied against a judgment or settlement from a tortfeasor. Unless the
plan can identify a particular asset that rightly belongs to it, then the proper
cause of action is not a constructive trust, but rather a quasi-contract claim. If
the Court had to choose between a constructive trust and a quasi-contract
claim in the Sereboffcase, the Court should have determined that the action is
a quasi-contract claim because the plan cannot claim the beneficiary has the
particular asset in his possession; the plan has a different asset and only seeks
to obtain money.
Dobbs then distinguishes the constructive trust and quasi-contract further
by saying that "[w]here the quasi-contract plaintiff wins a simple money
judgment, enforceable by execution, the constructive trust plaintiff who
proves his claim by clear and convincing evidence wins an in personam order
that requires the defendant to transfer legal rights and title of specific
property or intangibles.4 38 This statement is consistent with the Supreme
Court's analysis in Mertens that money damages are the archetypal legal
remedy.139 The danger is evident where the property that the plaintiff seeks is
nothing more than money, in that a constructive trust and a quasi-contract
claim are virtually indistinguishable. 40 The particular money paid by the plan
is not in the hands of the beneficiary because it was paid to the healthcare
provider. The particular money in the hands of the beneficiary is money
received from a third-party tortfeasor. Further, the particular money in the
hands of the beneficiary from a third-party tortfeasor is earmarked for pain
and suffering, lost wages, medical expenses, permanent injury, etc. Thus, it
appears that the plan is seeking not to recover a particular asset that rightly
belongs to it from the beneficiary when it seeks to recover funds earmarked
for pain and suffering, lost wages, permanent injury, etc., but the plan in
reality seeks to recover money from the beneficiary's possession. The
appropriate claim for such recovery is quasi-contract.
If the plan seeks nothing more than money held for the plan by the
beneficiary, one must answer the question: what happens if the beneficiary
137. Id.
138. Id. at 590-91 (footnotes omitted).
139. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993).
140. The distinction between a constructive trust and a quasi-contract claim is virtually
indistinguishable when money is the only award for both because the same thing occurs in
both situations; that is, the defendant gives the plaintiff money. It is even more
indistinguishable when the money involved is not traceable to a particular fund such as a
funds in a particular trust or funds that are earmarked for a particular purpose.
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squanders the money? If the beneficiary no longer possesses the property that
the plan claims, the beneficiary may still be personally liable under a creditor
claim.141 This, according to Knudson, is also a legal claim because it seeks to
impose personal liability on the beneficiary. 42 Thus, since the plan does not
seek title for a particular asset that rightly belongs to it, and the remedy is not
to require the beneficiary to convey title of that asset to the plan, the relief
sought in Sereboff was not a constructive trust.143 Instead, courts couch the
relief as an equitable lien. 144
2. Equitable Lien
At common law, the term equitable lien is "intensely undefined.' ' 145 The
equitable lien, like the constructive trust, is a mechanism of equitable
restitution and arises in cases of unjust enrichment. 46 Equitable liens differ
from constructive trusts in that, in some cases, the constructive trust can exact
more than the amount of restitution, while the equitable lien is "proportioned
to the unjust enrichment.' 47 The use of an equitable lien usually is limited to
when a constructive trust is too excessive. 48 For example, if D obtains
money from P and uses it to purchase improved land, then P has a con-
structive trust and can force D to convey title to P; however, if D obtains
money from P and uses it together with his money to purchase improved
land, then P only has an equitable lien against the property because for P to
141. DOBBS, supra note 49, at 591-92.
142. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213, 214 (2002).
143. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., 547 U.S. 356, 360 (2006) ("Mid Atlantic
[sought] to collect from the Sereboffs the medical expenses it had paid on their behalf.").
144. Id. at 363 ("[Mid Atlantic] alleged breach of contract and sought money, to be sure,
but it sought its recovery through a constructive trust or equitable lien on a specifically
identified fund, not from the Sereboffs' assets generally, as would be the case with a contract
action at law.").
145. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 119, at 319-20 (quoting Brundson v. Allard, (1859) 121
Eng. Rep. 8, 11 (Q.B.) (opinion of Erie, J.)). Even modernly, the Court would not understate
the confusion surrounding equitable liens by saying that the concept is intensely undefined.
However, McClintock attempts to define an equitable lien as "a charge which will be
enforced in equity against specific property, though there is no valid lien at law; equity
imposes liens either to carry out the intention of the parties to give security or to prevent
injustice, regardless of intent." Id. at 319.
146. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 161 ("Where property of one person can by
a proceeding in equity be reached by another as security for a claim on the ground that
otherwise the former would be unjustly enriched, an equitable lien arises.").
147. DOBBS, supra note 49, at 603.
148. Id. at 602.
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receive the entire value of the land and improvements would be excessive. 149
In other words, the lien is limited to the amount P contributed to the property.
The foregoing examples provide some guidance in the analysis in ERISA
cases, but they still leave the question unclear. The plan gives the beneficiary
funds to pay for medical expenses and seeks to impose a lien against the
beneficiary's judgment. The judgment contains compensatory damages,
including several items for which the plan has failed to compensate the
beneficiary (pain and suffering, lost wages, permanent loss, future medical
expenses, loss of consortium, etc.). These damages are funds belonging in
good conscience to the beneficiary, not the plan. The beneficiary is also
compensated for past medical expenses paid by the plan. These damages are
funds belonging, in good conscience, to the plan.
While the example is helpful, it does not help decide the situation
presented in Sereboff. In Sereboff, the beneficiary did not combine his money
with the money provided by the plan to obtain the judgment. Rather, the plan
paid that money to the healthcare provider and then sought a lien against the
beneficiary's judgment. 150 In other words, the Plan did not contribute to the
actual judgment. In the Dobbs examples above,' 5' the equitable lien is
equivalent to the amount that the plan paid the beneficiary because that is the
amount by which the beneficiary has been unjustly enriched. However, in
Sereboff, the amount that the plaintiff paid on behalf of the beneficiary was
not necessarily equivalent to the amount by which the beneficiary was
unjustly enriched.
The beneficiary was unjustly enriched only by the amount that he received
from the tortfeasor as compensation for medical expenses, because the plan
had already compensated the defendant for that amount. But the plan did not
contribute any funds to the beneficiary for pain and suffering, lost wages,
permanent injury, future medical expenses, etc. The plan only contributed
funds to the beneficiary for medical expenses. The beneficiary ought not to
be able to receive compensation for medical expenses he has not paid, and
likewise, the plan should not be able to receive compensation for other
damages for which it has not contributed.
52
149. See id.
150. Sereboffv. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., 547 U.S. 356, 360 (2006).
151. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
152. A point of clarification: a beneficiary should be able to recover from the tortfeasor
even though the plan has paid for his medical expenses. Generally, under the collateral
source rule, a plaintiff should not be precluded from recovering those medical expenses.
However, pursuant to ERISA and the agreement between the plan and the beneficiary, it
would be unjust to allow the beneficiary to keep those medical expenses that he has
contracted to repay. However, the contract cannot be enforced in an action for assumpsit or
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In Sereboff, the Supreme Court considered the Knudson case and
concluded that the difference in the two cases was the element of
possession. 153 Without regard for the general principles of equity, the
requirements for an equitable lien, and the limitations on the types of relief
generally available, the Court allowed the plan to impose an equitable lien for
the full amount of benefits paid to the beneficiary. 154 However, the amount of
the judgment that was attributable to medical expenses is unclear. If the
tortfeasor is liable for $75,000 of the beneficiary's medical expenses and the
plan paid it on his behalf, then the plan may seek an equitable lien in the
amount of $75,000. In order to determine if the lien is in fact equitable, the
district courts should require the jury to fill out a special verdict form
attributing the judgment to certain compensatory damages. If the jury
determines that, for whatever reason, the tortfeasor is liable only for $50,000
in medical expenses, the plan may seek an equitable lien for $50,000.
As in constructive trusts, if a beneficiary squanders the money or for some
reason does not have that money in his or her possession, then the beneficiary
could be held personally liable under creditor/debtor law, which is a legal
remedy.'55 If, in the Sereboff case, the jury attributed $50,000 to medical
expenses and the plan sought a $75,000 lien, then the relief sought would be
legal for two reasons. First, the $25,000 obtained in the judgment over the
amount attributed for medical expenses ($50,000) does not belong in good
conscience to the plan, and, second, the plan seeks to impose personal
liability on the beneficiary for an amount over the amount by which the
beneficiary was unjustly enriched. By allowing the plan to recover $25,000
that it is not entitled to receive, the federal courts are providing an unjust
result.
B. Traditional Legal Remedies
While there are several forms of legal remedies, legal restitution in its
relevant form of assumpsit, replevin, and detinue are the most applicable to
this discussion. In addition, damages, which according to Mertens are the
archetypal legal remedy, 56 are also relevant to this discussion. In fact, if the
an action generally in contract because both of those remedies are legal in nature and thus
prohibited by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
153. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 362-63.
154. The Sereboffs settled their suit against the third party tortfeasor for $750,000.00.
Mid Atlantic claimed an equitable lien in the amount of $74,869.37, which was the total
amount that Mid Atlantic paid on behalf of the Sereboffs. Id. at 360.
155. See DOBBS, supra note 49, at 591.
156. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993).
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remedy provided in Sereboff is considered restitution, the analysis continues
by asking whether the restitution is legal or equitable. The restitution in
Sereboff is not equitable, 157 but legal in nature, a remedy that is specifically
prohibited under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). 158 If the remedy is not legal
restitution, then it is properly labeled as damages, the archetypal legal
remedy.
1. Assumpsit and Replevin/Detinue
The law recognizes that in some contract cases, expectation and reliance
damages are not sufficient to accomplish justice.' 59 The remedy of restitution
in contract cases usually takes the form of recovering the amount or the
specific item by which the breaching party has been unjustly enriched when
the non-breaching party has already conferred a benefit. 60 Under common
law, legal restitution took two main forms: where the plaintiff had legal title,
and where the plaintiff did not have legal title but claimed contractual
entitlement. While ejectment, replevin, and detinue were utilized when
dealing with specific goods or chattels, 16' assumpsit was typically a contract
that was either express or implied by the conduct of the parties. 62 The
following analysis will show that the actions dealt with in this Comment
more closely resemble an action in assumpsit than an equitable lien.
The plaintiff could recover money or property under the legal action of
replevin or detinue if a specific object is considered property or chattel, the
157. See supra Part III.
158. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
159. Hansen Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1297, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(stating that "[riestitution has been characterized as "a fall-back position" for the injured
party who is unable to prove expectancy damages").
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 370 (1981) (stating that "[a] party is
entitled to restitution... only to the extent that he has conferred a benefit on the other party
by way of part performance or reliance").
161. DOBBS, supra note 49, at 573. Ejectment, Replevin, and Detinue are the three main
types of restitution when the Plaintiff has legal title.
162. DOBBS, supra note 49, at 571. "Assumpsit was the common law form by which
contract claims were redressed. Sometimes the contract would be express, sometimes
implied by the parties' action, by in either event a genuine contract. However, the assumpsit
action also came to be used when the parties had no contract at all, so long as the plaintiff
could convince the Court that he ought to recover sometime from the defendant as a matter
ofjustice or good conscience." See also, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining
assumpsit as "(1) An express or implied promise, not under seal, by which one person
undertakes to do some act or pay something to another.., or (2) A common-law action for
breach of such a promise or for breach of a contract").
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title to which belongs in good conscience to the plaintiff.163 Replevin was
originally used to "regain chattels that had been wrongfully distrained.'
164
Unlike replevin, "detinue was commonly used in bailment situations where
the bailee refused to return the bailed goods.', 165 Detinue typically required
that the duty to return the bailment be grounded in contract. 166 This action
could arise in several situations; for example, when the defendant wrongfully
acquired the property, when the defendant rightfully acquired the property
and wrongfully held it, or when the defendant possessed the property without
tortious obtainment. 67 The main difference between replevin and detinue is
thus the manner in which the property was obtained.
68
Assumpsit differs from replevin and detinue in that it is not limited to
cases that involve title, ownership, or possession; rather, assumpsit "could
award restitution for money, goods, or services.' 69 According to Dobbs,
legal restitution in assumpsit can be applied to several fact patterns; yet only
one merits mention here: Money paid for the defendant's use. 17 Generally,
the plaintiff need only pay the defendant's debt, and when the defendant asks
for the plaintiff's help (i.e. defendant asks plaintiff to pay his debt), the
plaintiff is entitled to restitution. 171 If the plaintiff is not an officious
intermeddler, the property given was not gratuitous, and the defendant
chooses to contract/accept the funds (restitution in this situation), under the
163. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining replevin as "(1) An action
for the repossession of personal property wrongfully taken or detained by the defendant,
whereby the plaintiff gives security for and holds the property until the court decides who
owns it.... (2) A writ obtained from a court authorizing the retaking of personal property
wrongfully taken or detained" and also defining detinue as "[a] common-law action to
recover personal property wrongfully taken by another").
164. DOBBS, supra note 49, at 574. See also Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)
(defining the verb distrain as "[t]o seize (goods) by distress, a legal remedy entitling the
rightful owner to recover property wrongfully taken").
165. Dons, supra note 49, at 573.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 574.
168. This distinction is much like the difference between larceny and embezzlement. The
main difference between the two lies in the question of whether there was a trespass in the
taking. If there was no trespass in the taking, then the property was lawfully obtained and
there is no larceny. However, even though the defendant obtained the property lawfully, if
the bailee misappropriates the property with animus furandi, then he will be guilty of
embezzlement. Embezzlement was created to fill the empty gap in larceny and to punish
those who would gain lawful possession and subsequently misappropriate the bailor's
property. Detinue seems to fill the same gap for Replevin.
169. DOBBS, supra note 49, at 576-577.
170. Id. at 581-582.
171. Id.
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rule for money paid for the defendants use, the plaintiff's claim qualifies for
legal restitution.
1 72
Consider the situation of ERISA liens and specifically in Sereboff.'73 The
situation described by Dobbs remains unchanged. The plan pays a debt
incurred by the beneficiary, the beneficiary recovers funds that it agreed to
repay under the "acts of third parties" provision, and the plan is entitled to
payment of those funds, that is, restitution. 174 The restitution is based upon a
contract much like the one in Barnes v. Alexander, 75 yet is significantly
different. In Barnes, the Supreme Court upheld "the familiar rul[e] of equity
that a contract to convey a specific object even before it is acquired will make
the contractor a trustee as soon as he gets a title to the thing." 176 Justice
Holmes "concluded that Barnes' undertaking 'create[d] a lien' upon the
portion of the monetary recovery due Barnes from the client, which Street
and Alexander 177 could 'follow... into the hands of... Barnes,' 'as soon as
[the fund] was identified."' 78 The Supreme Court in Sereboffpresumed that a
beneficiary's judgment against a tortfeasor is sufficient to constitute a
specific object and thus to qualify for an equitable lien. 179 The Court also
172. Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164 (1907). Cotnam is the typical casebook contract
case illustrating the hurdles over which the plaintiff must jump in order to obtain a judgment
for restitution in general. It's worthy of noting that Cotnam did not distinguish between legal
and equitable restitution and the hurdles enunciated in that case apply equally to both.
173. See supra note 13-21 and accompanying text.
174. Observe that this Comment is not arguing that the plan is not entitled to restitution,
rather, this Comment is arguing that restitution in the full amount of benefits paid to the
beneficiary from a monetary judgment that represents less than full recovery is a legal
remedy and not authorized by ERISA. An equitable lien, limited to the amount of the
benefits recovered for medical expenses, is permissible.
175. Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117 (1914) (relied upon by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 363-64). Street and Alexander were attorneys who
were entitled to a portion of the entire judgment because they worked on the case and the
main attorney on the case, Barnes, made an agreement that they would be paid one third of
the one fourth that the judgment in that case.
176. Barnes, 232 U.S. at 121.
177. Id. at 123.
178. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., 547 U.S. 356, 364 (2006) (quoting Barnes,
232 U.S. at 121, 123) (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 364-65. This Comment posits that the Supreme Court presumed that the
judgment was a specific object because the court never answered the question what a
specific object is. The Supreme Court simply said "[m]uch like Barnes' promise to Street
and Alexander, the "Acts of Third Parties" provision in the Sereboffs' plan specifically
identified a particular fund, distinct from the Sereboffs' general assets-'[a] 11 recoveries
from a third party (whether by lawsuit, settlement, or otherwise)'-and a particular share of
that fund to which Mid Atlantic was entitled-'that portion of the total recovery which is
due [Mid Atlantic] for benefits paid' " (emphasis added). All the court said was that a
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dismissed the tracing requirement that is typically required for equitable liens
because the Court asserts that equitable liens and equitable liens by
agreement "are different species of relief.' 180 But they are not so different
that they alter the requirements set forth in Knudson;'81 that is, regardless of
whether the equitable lien is by agreement, the lien cannot impose personal
liability on the beneficiary of the plan.182 If it does impose personal liability
on the beneficiary of the plan, then the remedy is legal and thus prohibited.' 83
While the Supreme Court opined that the ERISA equitable lien is identical
to the equitable lien in Barnes, the Court failed to fully analyze the equitable
lien in Barnes against the purported equitable lien in Sereboff. In Barnes, the
plaintiffs performed work for the funds that they earned under an
agreement. 184 In Sereboff, the plaintiffs paid money to a third party for the
benefit of the defendants. 185 The Court should have asked whether the
situation looks more like an equitable lien by agreement or an action for
assumpsit. The line between the two is fine and far from bright, but, in the
absence of brightness, the federal courts should illuminate it by analyzing that
line completely.
If an equitable lien was created by the equity courts in order to provide
redress for persons who have a loss against another who has an unjust gain,
then the ERISA lien situation qualifies to a limited extent. 8 6 However, once
the plan seeks relief beyond that limited extent, then the relief becomes legal;
that is, it becomes an action for assumpsit. An ERISA plan can impose a lien
against a beneficiary's judgment to the extent that the beneficiary recovered
medical expenses from the tortfeasor. If the lien exceeds this limitation and
specific object is "a particular fund, distinct from the Sereboffs' general assets." However, if
the plan is not entitled to the particular fund distinct from the Sereboffs' assets, then it still
may not claim an equitable lien under the Knudson rule. For example, if the plan identified
one of several bank accounts held by the beneficiary, it would be a particular fund, distinct
from the Sereboffs' general assets, but the plan would not be entitled to it. Since the plan is
not entitled to that bank account, the lien would impose personal liability on the beneficiary
of the plan. Such a claim is a legal remedy prohibited by ERISA.
180. Id. The Supreme Court further stated that "Barnes confirms that no tracing
requirement of the sort asserted by the Sereboffs' applies to equitable liens by agreement or
assignment .... Leaving open the question of whether a tracing requirement of another sort
may exist. Specifically, perhaps a tracing requirement exists that mandates that the plaintiff
be particularly entitled to the fund that it identifies.
181. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Barnes, 232 U.S. at 119-20.
185. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 360 (stating specifically that "the plan paid the couple's
medical expenses").
186. See supra Part III.A.2.
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seeks money that the beneficiary received as compensation for other injuries
such as lost wages, future medical expenses, loss of consortium, etc., then it
will be considered a legal action for assumpsit. All of this hinges on the test
set forth by the Supreme Court in Knudson.
However, as discussed earlier, that test is incomplete without the element
that the plaintiff be, in good conscience, entitled to the funds.'8 7 Thus, the test
should be summarized as follows: restitution will lie in equity when it seeks
to restore the plaintiff particular funds or property in the defendant's
possession that the plaintiff is in good conscience entitled to. Restitution will
not lie in equity but in law when the plaintiff seeks to impose personal
liability on the defendant.
Since the plan is not in good conscience entitled to recover money
received by the beneficiary from the tortfeasor specifically labeled as
something other than medical expenses, the action for restitution does not lie
in equity, but in law. If the plan were allowed to seek legal remedies, then the
plan would be able to claim restitution under the theory of assumpsit alleging
money paid for defendant's use. But this is not the case. The plan cannot seek
legal remedies and because the relief sought is legal, then the court should
dismiss the case for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
88
2. Damages
The difference between restitution in general and an award for damages is
of great importance here because, as the Mertens court stated, damages are
the "classic form of legal relief."189 According to Dobbs, "[a] damages award
focuses on the victim's loss and seeks compensation (or partial compensa-
tion); the restitution award focuses on the breacher and seeks to prevent his
unjust enrichment by forcing restitution of gains he received under the
contract."' 90 Thus, for restitution, the question is not one of how much the
plaintiff lost, but of how much the defendant gained unjustly. When a
plaintiff gauges his recovery not by the value of the defendants gain, but by
the value of his own loss, the measure is traditionally legal.' 91 Other
187. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
188. FED. R. Cw. P. 12(b)(6).
189. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248,255 (1993) (emphasis omitted).
190. 3 DOBBS, supra note 49, at 160.
191. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 450 F.3d 570, 575 (4th Cir. 2006), vacated
on other grounds, 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008). The Fourth Circuit stated that the impediment that
prohibited recovery in Knudson, that is, possession, was absent from Sereboff, but was
"present in this case, and it precludes plaintiff from recovering under an equitable restitution
theory. Plaintiff does not allege that funds owed to him are in defendants' possession, but
instead that these funds never materialized at all. He therefore gauges his recovery not by the
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requirements imposed by the courts and developed under the federal common
law limit the recovery to money that is specifically identifiable and in the
possession of the beneficiary.
92
In this case, the Sereboffs' judgment was their property. 93 Mid Atlantic
must, according to the federal common law, specifically identify property
within the possession of the beneficiary and that property must belong in
good conscience to the plan. However, just because the plan identifies the
judgment recovered from the tortfeasor does not mean that that identification
is appropriate. An appropriate identification would be limited to the amount
of medical expenses that the beneficiary recovers from the tortfeasor. Thus,
before the federal courts allow ERISA liens against the property of a
beneficiary, the courts should first apply this appropriateness test: Did the
plan specifically identify property within the possession of the beneficiary to
which the plan is in good conscience entitled?
Courts have presumed that the identified fund can appropriately be the
entire judgment without considering the adverse effects of that presump-
tion.194 The judgment is the property of the beneficiary, 95 and the plan is not
in good conscience entitled to funds in excess of that which is recovered for
medical expenses. The plan thus seeks to impose personal liability on the
beneficiary to repay the full amount of benefits, in the form of simple money
damages. Awarding these damages gives the plan a measure of recovery
value of defendants' nonexistent gain, but by the value of his own loss-a measure that is
traditionally legal, not equitable. Thus, at core, he seeks to obtain a judgment imposing a
merely personal liability upon the defendant[s] to pay a sum of money. As Knudson
explained, historically such claims were viewed essentially as actions at law, and they are
therefore unavailable under § 1132(a)(3)." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). LaRue is distinguishable from Knudson and Sereboff because the action is for a
breach of fiduciary duty by the plan administrator for failing to comply with the
beneficiary's investment instructions. However, as Judge Wilkinson points out, § 1132(a)(3)
applies the same limitation regardless of who is suing whom. Sections (a)(1) and (a)(2)
provide other remedies for individuals seeking to sue a plan administrator, but the
application of section (a)(3) requires in all situations an analysis of whether the relief sought
is in fact equitable. This case was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court which held
that section (a)(3) does apply to an individual plan participant of a defined contribution plan.
192. See Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Servs., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); Great West Life
Ins. and Annuity Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
193. Cf Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 285
(2006) (recognizing that a judgment awarded a plaintiff in a civil matter for money damages
is considered that plaintiffs property).
194. See Sereboff, 547 U.S. 356 (2006); Dugan v. Nickla, 763 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. I11.
1991).
195. See Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 285.
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based on the plan's loss, rather than the beneficiary's gain. Thus, the relief is
legal.
3. The Effect of the Merger of Courts of Equity and Courts of Law, and
the Bottom Line
The line between legal and equitable restitution is fine, but far from bright.
In modem times, the inquiry into the nature of the remedy has become
increasingly irrelevant because the equitable and legal courts have merged.
However, even though the distinction is based in antiquity, Congress
intended to force the courts into the analysis because the policies and
principles undergirding ERISA seek to further justice, protect the employee,
and protect the employer.1 96 The equity limitation seeks to do just that. The
courts must "distinguish between actions which are based upon promises and
actions which are based upon unjust enrichment., 197 Because Congress
requires such a distinction, the inquiry into the nature of the remedy is even
more important in this case. 198 Thus, the courts should ask, what is equity?
Dobbs posits that:
[o]ne group of ideas associated with the term equity suggests
fairness and moral quality. The law of fiduciary and confidential
relationships developed by equity Courts and carried on today in
many forms, derived from equity's early emphasis on moral
196. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1003.
197. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION §107, cmt. b (1937) (stating that "[i]n many
situations the amount of damages for a breach of contract would be the same as the amount
to be recovered on the ground of unjust enrichment and in such situations it is immaterial
whether the right of the claimant is based upon the breach of contract or upon unjust
enrichment .... If the suit is for breach of contract the disappointed promisee is entitled to
the value of what he was promised. In cases in which he seeks restitution on the ground of
unjust enrichment he is entitled to no more than the value of the benefit which he has
conferred upon the other party, except where the other party is more at fault than the
claimant, in which case the amount of recovery may exceed the value of the benefit
conferred. Even where the other party is more at fault, the recovery will not exceed an
amount larger than the gain to the one or the loss of the other." (citation omitted)).
198. Cf Mank v. Green, 323 F. Supp. 2d 115, 122-23 (D. Me. 2004) ("The remedy of
equitable restitution sought by Plaintiff under section 502(a)(3) is subject to the traditional
equitable considerations. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit previously offered
guidance on the weighing of equities in the context of a traditional equitable action for
restitution under ERISA's federal common law: '[t]he trial Court should consider whatever
factors it may reasonably believe shed light on the fairness of reimbursement, and weigh
those factors against the backdrop of general equitable considerations and the guiding
principles and purposes of ERISA.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Kwatcher v. Mass. Serv.
Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 967 (lst Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by
Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004))).
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rectitude .... This idea that equity means moral rectitude is
frequently coupled with the idea of flexibility. Equity is said to be
flexible rather than rigid, its interest is in justice rather than law. 199
Over the years, several equitable maxims have been propounded that direct
the judgments of the courts of equity.00 Of these maxims, the federal courts
have applied very few to these ERISA lien situations.
In order for an equity court to grant equitable relief to the person seeking
it, "[h]e who seeks equity must do equity., 20' Since equity is flexible, the
court should review the moral and fundamental expectations of all parties and
render to each what he is due.20 2 If the party seeking equity must also, via
equity, pay the other, then he would be required to pay the other before the
judge will grant him his request.
The plan is seeking equity from the beneficiary under § 1 132(a)(3), but the
plan will not be entitled to the full amount that it has paid. Rather, the plan
will be required to limit the lien amount to the amount by which the
beneficiary is unjustly enriched. On the same note, the beneficiary is required
to do equity as well in that it must pay the plan the amount attributed to
medical expenses that it received from the tortfeasor. °3
199. DOBBS, supra note 49, at 63. By stating that equity is interested in justice rather than
law, Dobbs implies that the two are inherently contradictory. As discussed below, this
Comment will argue that they are not.
200. See, e.g., MCCLINTOCK, supra note 119, at 55 ("He who seeks equity must do
equity"); id. at 59 ("Must come into equity with clean hands"); id. at 69 ("The law prevails
where equities are equal"); id. at 71("Equity aids the vigilant"); id. at 76 ("Equity will not
suffer a wrong without a remedy").
201. Id. at 53. See also George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence: Implied
Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Remedies in Equity for Federal Agencies, 12 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 1 n.37 (2007) (stating that "[t]he practical meaning of this maxim is that
whatever the nature of the remedy sought, the court will not give equitable relief to one
seeking it unless he will admit and provide for all of the equitable rights, claims and
demands of his adversary growing out of, or necessarily involved in, the subject matter of
the controversy"); Roger Young and Stephen Spitz, SUEM - Spitz's Ultimate Equitable
Maxim: In Equity, Good Guys Should Win and Bad Guys Should Lose, 55 S. C. L. Rev. 175
(2003); Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and Principled Discretion: The Michigan
Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 609, 618 (1997) (stating that the maxim is "designed
to prevent the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant").
202. McQuiddy v. Ware, 87 U.S. 14, 19 (1873) (stating that the complainant has not
observed this equitable maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity. "While admitting
his indebtedness, and that it has existed for ten years or more, [the complainant] does not
make a tender in court of what is justly due, although he is asking the court to set aside the
proceedings by which this indebtedness was satisfied, on the ground of their absolute
nullity.")
203. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
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When he who seeks equity also does equity, equity is also said to "aid[]
the vigilant." 2°4 In simple words, justice will render to each his due, and he
who is more vigilant is due more. In the situation addressed here, it seems
that equity completely fails to aid the vigilant because it strips the beneficiary
of his compensation for suing the tortfeasor. For the beneficiary, vigilance
requires him or her to seek compensation from the tortfeasor. By the terms of
most plans, the beneficiary is not personally responsible to repay the benefits
unless the beneficiary sues a tortfeasor and a judgment is received from the
tortfeasor. The beneficiary, then, could choose to not seek a judgment against
the tortfeasor and subsequently be in a better position than if he or she did
seek compensation. In that case, the plan does not recover any of its benefits
and is, in fact, in a worse position than it was before the plan sought a legal
remedy.
Because the beneficiary is vigilant in seeking compensation from the
tortfeasor, he or she should be rewarded for that effort. But if the plan pays
$200,000 for medical expenses, and the beneficiary can only recover
$500,000 from the tortfeasor, then the disbursement of that judgment will
effectively leave the beneficiary with no compensation for pain and suffering,
lost wages, permanent loss, and other compensatory damages to which he or
she is entitled. One-third of the judgment will first be disbursed to the
attorney handling the case, $200,000 will then be disbursed to the plan, and
the beneficiary receives approximately $100,000.205 If the beneficiary's
judgment only represents compensation for $35,000 attributable to medical
expenses plus compensation for other damages, the plan should have an
equitable lien against the judgment for $35,000, not $200,000. Otherwise, the
vigilant is punished for seeking compensation for his or her injuries that were
paid for by the plan. The plan may very well have subrogation rights where it
can pursue the claim itself, but that is not the case here. The plan watches
while the beneficiary relives the event, pays the attorney's fees, pays the
court costs and then once all of the hard work is done, the plan runs to the
courthouse and expects the beneficiary to give it all of the money he or she
received for injuries that are unrelated to the plan's contribution. The
concepts of unjust enrichment and equity courts' aiding the vigilant are
supported by the policy rationale behind ERJSA. °6
204. McCLINTOCK, supra note 119, at 71.
205. Sometimes the contingency fee percentages will change depending on the type of
cases. For example, in medical malpractice cases, the typical percentage is approximately
35-40% because of the excessive nature of the preparatory work.
206. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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Another great maxim of equity is that one must come into equity "with
clean hands."207 This maxim may result in a denial of an equitable remedy on
the basis of his "unclean hands" - that is, his misconduct - provided that the
misconduct is sufficiently related to his claim. "The unclean hands defense is
closely related to other equitable defenses such as unconscionability or
unfairness in contracts, and even to equitable concerns over hardship., 20 8 By
seeking legal restitution via couching the claim in an equitable manner, the
plan does not come to the court with clean hands. Rather, its hands are dirty
with semantics and rationalizations that further blur the distinction between
equitable and legal restitution.
lV. THE PRINCIPLE THAT PREVENTS MEDICAID OVER-REIMBURSEMENT
SHOULD ALSO APPLY TO ERISA FIDUCIARIES
The distinction between the analysis in Medicaid and ERISA liens is that
federal law provides guidelines for third party liability in Medicaid cases,
while the legislature is relatively silent in ERISA cases. 209 However, even
though the black letter law is different, the solution is not to ignore this recent
understanding of Medicaid law. Rather, the rationale and public policy
behind such a law ought to be applied to other areas of the law that have a
similar effect on beneficiaries. The public policy does not change from
Medicaid to ERISA cases in that it is fundamentally unjust for an ERISA
plan, Medicaid, or medical care provider to share in damages for which it has
provided no compensation.210 The question then becomes, why is it
fundamentally unjust?2 1' Because the law says so, or because such a result is
naturally reprehensible to the minds of rational people? The principle of
justice is not some internal function of man's creation, but rather, it is an
207. DOBBS, supra note 49, at 92.
208. Id.
209. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
210. Cf infra note 225 and accompanying text.
211. See Jack B. Weinstein, Every Day Is a Good Day for a Judge to Lay Down His
Professional Life for Justice, 32 FoRD AM URB. L.J. 131 (2004) for a general discussion of
why the question is important and what judges should do in response. Judge Weinstein states
that "the judge embraces his professional life most fully when he is prepared to fight-and
be criticized or reversed--in striving for justice." Id. at 131. Weinstein concludes that
judges must follow the law to avoid a kritarchy--except, it is submitted, when
that law requires the violation of the essence of mankind's sense of justice. The
incongruity between the law and demands of a core right (call it natural justice
if you will) must be absolutely clear if a judge is to rely on this fall-back duty
to the heart of fairness. Id. at 132 (footnote omitted.)
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external principle upon which all things are based.2 12 Such a result is
fundamentally unjust because justice is an objective, external measuring stick
to determine if each person is punished or rewarded, given to or taken from,
in accordance with what they deserve.213 And in this case, justice is scarce.As
opposed to ERISA cases, the Supreme Court followed the principle ofjustice
in Arkansas Department of Health andHuman Services v. Ahlborn.214
A. Ahlborn Enforces the Principle that Medicaid Can Seek a Lien Only in
the Amount of the Third Party's Liability for Medical Expenses.
Before a Medicaid recipient can receive the benefits of Medicaid, he or
she must apply to the state Department of Medical Assistance Services
212. See Arthur Allan Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DuKE L.J. 1229,
1249 (1979). Leff concludes that there is no extra-systemic principle of justice upon which
we can base our laws, but then paradoxically turns around and relies on such a principle to
support his entire belief system:
I want to believe-and so do you-in a complete, transcendent, and
immanent set of propositions about right and wrong, findable rules that
authoritatively and unambiguously direct us how to live righteously. I also
want to believe-and so do you-in no such thing, but rather that we are
wholly free, not only to choose for ourselves what we ought to do, but to
decide for ourselves, individually and as a species, what we ought to be. What
we want, Heaven help us, is simultaneously to be perfectly ruled and perfectly
free, that is, at the same time to discover the right and the good and to create it.
All I can say is this: it looks as if we are all we have. Given what we know
about ourselves and each other, this is an extraordinarily unappetizing prospect;
looking around the world, it appears that if all men are brothers, the ruling
model is Cain and Abel. Neither reason, nor love, nor even terror, seems to
have worked to make us "good," and worse than that, there is no reason why
anything should. Only if ethics were something unspeakable by us, could law
be unnatural, and therefore unchallengeable. As things now stand, everything is
up for grabs. Nevertheless:
Napalming babies is bad.
Starving the poor is wicked.
Buying and selling each other is depraved.
Those who stood up to and died resisting Hitler, Stalin, Amin, and Pol Pot-
and General Custer too-have earned salvation.
Those who acquiesced deserve to be damned.
There is in the world such a thing as evil.
[All together now:] Sez who?
God help us.
Id. at 1229, 1249.
213. Id.
214. See supra note 27 and accompanying text infra Part IV.B.
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(DMAS).215 "As a condition of eligibility," the applicant must "assign the
State any rights .. .to payment for medical care from any third party."
216
While the Medicaid recipient "assigns" his or her rights to the state to recover
from a third party, subsection H of section 1367a(a)(25) clearly defines and
explains the rights the applicant assigns to DMAS: "[T]o the extent that
payment has been made under [DMAS] . . . for health care items or services
furnished to an individual, the State is considered to have acquired the rights
of such individual to payment by any other party for such health care items
and services. ,,217 The necessary logical conclusion from the foregoing
federal provisions is that the Medicaid recipient retains his or her rights to
any and all recovery from a third party, except for those medical services or
care paid by DMAS, which was assigned to DMAS upon application. In
other words, DMAS only acquires the rights to the portion of a judgment,
settlement, or award that is allotted for medical services or care.
When a third party is liable for the injuries of a Medicaid recipient and the
state finds that seeking a lien would be economically advantageous (i.e. when
the amount of recovery exceeds the cost to recover), "the state will seek
reimbursement for such [medical] assistance [provided] to the extent of such
legal liability."218 The Supreme Court interpreted the term "legal liability" to
mean a judicially determined responsibility "to pay for care and services
available under the plan. 219 In other words, DMAS can only seek the amount
of medical expenses for which the third party is liable. For example, if the
defendant is only legally liable for $35,000 of the recipient's medical
expenses, yet the state has paid $200,000 in medical expenses, the state can
seek only compensation for that which the third party is liable, that is, the
$35,000.
In the Ahlborn case, Justice Stevens contrasted legal liability for medical
expenses paid for by the state with the third parties' legal liability for lost
wages, pain and suffering, or inheritance, the latter of which is clearly not
within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1367a(a)25(A). 220 "At the very least, then,
the federal third-party liability provisions require an assignment of no more
than the right to recover that portion of a settlement that represents payment
215. See, e.g., Medicaid in New York State, http://www.health.state.ny.us/healthcare/
medicaid/#apply (last visited on January 4, 2008).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(a)(1)(A) (2006).
217. Id. § 1396a(a)(25)(H) (emphasis added).
218. Id. § 1396a(a)(25)(B) (2006).
219. Arkansas Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 280 (2006); 42
U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (2006).
220. See Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 280, 281.
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for medical care. ' 221 "Again, the statute does not sanction an assignment of
rights to payment for anything other than medical expenses - not lost wages,
not pain and suffering, not an inheritance., 222 The Supreme Court definitively
stated that the provisions that permit DMAS to seek reimbursement are
limited to the portion of the judgment, settlement, or award that is dedicated
to medical expenses, which is an implied exception to the anti-lien
provision.223 Any other result would be fundamentally unjust.
22 4
In Ahlborn, the court focused on fairness and, in a footnote, cited with
approval an illustrative case from the Washington Supreme Court
"explain[ing] that the department could not 'share in damages for which it
has provided no compensation' because such a result would be absurd and
fundamentally unjust.' '221 In Ahlborn, the recipient settled for $550,000 and
Medicaid paid $215,645.30 in benefits for the beneficiary's medical
expenses.226 The parties stipulated that $35,581.47 of that settlement was
attributable to medical expenses. 227 Medicaid sought a lien for the full
amount of benefits paid;228 however, the Supreme Court only allowed
Medicaid a lien for the amount apportioned for medical expenses, 229 a result
the next section will argue is fundamentally just.
B. Treating ERISA Differently from Medicaid Promotes Legal Positivism.
The Supreme Court of the United States issued the Ahlborn opinion on
May 1, 2006, and subsequently issued the Sereboff opinion on May 15,
221. Id. at 282.
222. Id. at281.
223. Id. at 284. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(1) requires in pertinent part that "no lien may be
imposed against the property of an individual prior to his death on account of medical
assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under the state plan, except" in situations such as
fraudulently received payments or other situations not relevant in Ahlborn or here.
224. See Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 288.
225. Id. at 288 n.18 (discussing Flanigan v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 869 P.2d 14 (Wash.
1994)).
226. Id. at 274.
227. Id. To reach $35,581.47, the parties estimated the total value of the claim
(denominator) divided by the total amount of medical expenses (numerator). The applicable
rate determined from that fraction was then multiplied to the total settlement amount that
allowed the parties to determine what portion of the settlement was attributed to medical
expenses. The Court noted that if the risk of the parties "allocate[ing] away the state's
interest can be avoided either by obtaining the State's advance agreement to an allocation or,
if necessary, by submitting the matter to a court for decision." Id. at 289.
228. Id. at 278.
229. Id. at 292.
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2006.230 The marked distinction between the two cases begs the question:
Why are they different? At first glance, the difference is that Medicaid's anti-
lien provision limits the extent of the lien against the beneficiary's judgment,
while ERISA simply limits the plan to equitable relief without providing
further guidance on the issue.231 The logical conclusion is that the difference
must be in the promulgation of a law. This analysis is a prime example of
legal positivism, ignoring the principle ofjustice.
According to Thomas Aquinas, "[Law] is nothing else than an ordinance
of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the
community, and promulgated., 232 Justice is a principle outside of the
definition of a law and it is a standard by which laws are validated.233 It is
antithetical to say that a law is just because it is a law, but rather justice must
be some extra-systemic source in order to validate a law.234 However, legal
positivism, a theory of law positing that justice is a systemic principle created
by the legislature, 235 rejects the notion that law requires several elements in
230. See id., 547 U.S. 268 (2006); Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., 547 U.S. 356
(2006).
231. Compare Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, with Sereboff, 547 U.S. 356.
232. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, First Part of the Second Part, Question 90,
Article 4 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, trans., Christian Classics ed. 1981)
(2d ed. 1920).
233. Id. at Second Part of the Second Part, Question 58, Article 11. "[T]he matter of
justice is an external operation, in so far as either it or the thing we use by it is made
proportionate to some other person to whom we are related by justice. Now each man's own
is that which is due to him according to equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of
justice is nothing else than to render to each one his own."
234. Unfortunately, there is no dictionary definition for the term "extra-systemic."
However, it means exactly what it says: the principle of justice is not created or maintained
by the system, but rather is a principle created and maintained by those ordinances of reason
naturally written on the heart of man by God, through which the system is judged.
235. Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human
Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 302, 304 (1999)
("Law is regarded as a unified system of rules that, according to most variants, emanate from
state will. This system of rules is an 'objective' reality and needs to be distinguished from
law 'as it should be.' Classic positivism demands rigorous tests for legal validity. Extralegal
arguments, e.g., arguments that have no textual, systemic or historical basis, are deemed
irrelevant to legal analysis; there is only hard law, no soft law. For some, the unity of the
legal system will provide one correct answer for any legal problem; for others, even if law is
'open-textured,' it still provides determinate guidance for officials and individuals."
(citations omitted)); David Dyzenhaus, The Demise of Legal Positivism? 119 HARv. L. REV.
F. 112 (2006) (stating that because "both the positivistic conception of law as a system of
rules and the rival conception of law as a principled order are ultimately rival political
conceptions, officials who wish to remain faithful to law will try to make decisions that best
advance one of these political ideals.").
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order to be properly considered "law."236 This alternative theory of law is the
equivalent of putting the cart before the horse in that a law is just because it is
a law, not because it complies with a higher morality.237 Obviously, this
argument is easily recognizable as a circular fallacy.238 Instead of taking the
236. Charles E. Rice, Rights and the Need for Objective Moral Limits, 3 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 259 (2005). Professor Rice describes the theory of legal positivism as follows: "If one
cannot really know what justice is, how can one insist that a law must be just as a condition
of its validity? All theories of legal positivism share to some degree the denial of the ability
of reason to know what is right or wrong. These theories therefore focus on what the law is,
not on whether it is just. As [Hans] Kelsen put it, 'Any content whatsoever can be legal;
there is no human behavior which could not function as the content of a legal norm.' Thus,
the only requirement for a law to be valid and binding is that 'it has been constituted in a
particular fashion, born of a definite procedure and a definite rule.' And once a law is
enacted, it is obligatory. Since there is no higher law of nature or of God, the positive law
cannot be criticized as unjust. Kelsen believed that justice 'is not ascertainable by rational
knowledge at all . ... [Rather], [firom the standpoint of rational knowledge there are only
interests and conflicts of interests .... Justice is an irrational ideal.' Rights for the relativist,
therefore, are merely conventional." Id. at 268-69 (footnotes omitted).
237. Id.; see also Brian H. Bix, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL THEORY 120-21 (2004)
("'Positive law' is law that is created by human officials and institutions . . . . Legal
positivism was traditionally contrasted with natural law theory... that equated legal validity
with not being unjust. By contrast, legal positivism purports to separate the question of
whether a norm is 'law' within a particular system... from the question of the merits of that
norm or that system."); H. L. A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181-82 (1972) ("Here we shall
take Legal Positivism to mean the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth
that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often
done so.").
238. Illustrative dialogue between fictitious person A and fictitious person B:
A: "Is this just?"
B: "Yes."
A: "Why?"
B: "Because it is the law."
A: "Why is it the law?"
B: "Because the legislature said it is the law."
A: "What gives them the authority to say what the law is?"
B: "The Constitution, which is the supreme law, the paramount law, the law
of all laws."
Legal positivists end the argument there, but for a complete analysis the dialogue should
continue as follows:
A: "What gives the Constitution the ability to establish a legislature?
B: "The Declaration of Independence, because it establishes the United
States of America as a separate government."
A: "What gives the people the ability to secede and create a separate
government?"
B: "The law of nature and of nature's God."
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legal positive test, the federal courts should look to equity and should reason
that a law is just because it renders to each what he is due.239
The necessary question applies to all laws: Is this law just? In other words,
does it render to each what he is due? 240 The current status of Medicaid law
renders to each what he is due; Medicaid not only renders to the beneficiary
what he is due, but also renders to Medicaid what it is due.24' After Ahlborn,
the Supreme Court recognized the disparity in justice and essentially
concluded that the Medicaid law in Arkansas was fundamentally unjust.242
But the question remains: Why did the Supreme Court think that Arkansas'
statutory scheme was fundamentally unjust? It appears, after the Sereboff
opinion, that the Court's measure of justice is the law itself, which is
systemic.243 However, the law is not the source of justice; it is the object of
it.244 The Supreme Court argued that the state could not share in the recovery
239. See supra note 233.
240. See id.
241. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text. Essentially, Medicaid only recovers
from the beneficiary what the beneficiary recovers from the tortfeasor for medical expenses.
The beneficiary retains his or her rights to damages for pain and suffering, lost wages,
permanent injury, etc. This is just because it renders to each what he is due. Medicaid is due
the medical expenses that the tortfeasor pays, but it is not due the full amount of medical
expenses that it paid. Medicaid is not due the full amount of medical expenses that it paid
because that amount was not fully recovered by the beneficiary. A contrary result would
allow Medicaid to share in a judgment for which it provided no compensation. This analysis
is what Ahlborn said is absurd and fundamentally unjust. On the other hand, the beneficiary
is due the compensatory damages that the tortfeasor pays for everything other than medical
expenses. By this analysis, Medicaid seems particularly just while ERISA does not.
Furthermore, the difference in a trial result and a settlement is virtually the same. See Robert
J. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage, 60 FLA. L. REV. 125, 163-64 (2008) ("On average, settlements
produce better or no worse outcomes than trials. This is particularly so for defendants, who
have a greater disparity in the values achieved between trial and settlement. The difference
in value constitutes potential surplus. The defendant can manage the dispute resolution
process and avoid trial (a most expensive endeavor) by offering an amount from this surplus
that is sufficient to incentivize the plaintiff to settle. This explains in large part why
settlements are so prominent in tort actions. The tort system is not the 'all-or-nothing
proposition that its rules envision and its critics decry,' but it instead provides 'part-
recovery-most-of-the-time.' Deductions from compensation are a structural feature of the
tort system. The most obvious factor is the American rule of attorney fees." (citation
omitted)).
242. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
243. This appears to be the answer because the Supreme Court did not identify any other
explanation other than the distinction between the two bodies of law. In fact, the Supreme
Court did not even reference Ahlborn in Sereboff.
244. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From a Birmingham Jail, in 2 CLASSICS OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 653, 656 (Scott J. Hammond, Kevin
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of damages for which it provided no compensation.2 45 This is an argument
from justice, because the Court is essentially saying that the State is not
entitled to that money, or, in other words, it is not due that money. Rather, the
beneficiary is due that money.
On the contrary, the current status of ERISA law does not render to each
what he is due.246 The Supreme Court, after passing the justice test in
Ahlborn, failed remarkably in Sereboff. 47 In fact, the Court did not even
consider the question of what each party is due. This reveals that in Sereboff
the Court viewed justice as based solely on the existence, or lack thereof, of a
law promulgated by men. The Court did not ask what amount was
attributable to medical expenses. In the Sereboff case, as opposed to the
Ahlborn case, the Court did not say that allowing the plan to share in the
recovery for which it provided no compensation was fundamentally unjust.
Rather, the Court glossed over the issue and attempted to interpret the
specific law without applying equitable principles required of a court of
equity.248 The Supreme Court should, however, reconsider this issue and
apply the principle ofjustice to the analysis, as it did in Ahlborn.
V. CONCLUSION
ERISA liens should be limited under the principles of equity to only those
amounts for which the third-party tortfeasor is legally liable.24 9 Because
equity is meant to be flexible,250 honoring those who do equity,251 are
R. Hardwick & Howard J. Lubert eds., 2007). King, quoting St. Augustine, argued that "'an
unjust law is no law at all.' "
245. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlbom, 547 U.S. 268, 288 n.19 (2006).
246. See supra note 233. ERISA allows the plan to share in damages for which it has
provided no compensation. In terms of justice, this is exactly what the Supreme Court
denounced in Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 288 n. 19. In addition, the plan receives what it is due by
obtaining those funds earmarked for medical expenses from the settlement or judgment. The
plan here is different from Medicaid in that the beneficiaries of Medicaid are indigent and do
not pay for their insurance, whereas the beneficiaries of ERISA plans do pay for their
insurance for medical expenses. Even though they do not specifically write the check to the
insurance company, the employer pays the insurance company what it would otherwise pay
the employee. By providing a benefit to the employee, the benefit is compensation for
services. Regardless of the form of the compensation, the employee works for that benefit
and essentially pays for it. The benefit here is that the plan essentially promises to pay for
medical expenses, should some unforeseen event occur that requires the beneficiary to seek
medical treatment.
247. See supra notes 28-29.
248. See supra Part Il1.
249. See id.
250. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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vigilant252 and come with clean hands,253 the courts should apply the
principles of equity so that the undergirding principles of justice are
ultimately achieved.254 Instead, the courts have misapplied the principles of
equity by blurring the distinction between legal and equitable relief.255 While
Congress has determined, systemically, how ERISA will work, Congress
cannot alter the extra-systemic principle of justice, which informs equity. In
sum, Congress requires that the relief sought be equitable, and equity requires
that, for a plan to recover against a beneficiary, the plan must be (1) in good
faith entitled (2) to a specific object (3) in the possession (4) of the
defendant.
25 6
Furthermore, the outcome in Medicaid lien situations should be the same
in ERISA lien situations; indeed, the statutory requirements of both compel
such a result.257 Instead of basing the federal common law on the presence, or
lack thereof, of a promulgated law, the Supreme Court should base its rulings
on, or at minimum ensure consistency with, the fundamental principle of
258justice. Because the factual situation in ERISA and Medicaid cases are
virtually identical,259 the principles set forth in Ahlborn should inform the
conclusion in ERISA cases, regardless of the statutory variations.26 ° If the
result under Arkansas law was absurd and fundamentally unjust, then the
same result is likewise absurd and fundamentally unjust under ERISA.2 6 1
The result in ERISA and Medicaid cases can be just if the Supreme Court
strictly applies the statutory requirements for both. Without requiring certain
Knudson prerequisites for recovery in ERISA cases, the Supreme Court
essentially creates an atmosphere in which injustice can flourish. Instead, the
Court should require that the plan be, in good conscience, entitled to the
specific asset it designates, creating an atmosphere where justice can flourish.
251. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
255. See supra Part III.
256. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. These elements are nothing more
than the elements of equitable liens as they apply to ERISA.
257. See supra Part IV.
258. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 230-39 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
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